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Abstract
This paper investigates whether preference-based (empirical) power indices
differ significantly from their preference-free (theoretical) counterparts. Draw-
ing on the to date most comprehensive sample of EU Council votes (1993-
2011), we use item-response models to estimate the EU27 member states’
preferences (ideal points) in a one-dimensional policy space. Their posterior
distributions are then used for the calculation of empirical versions of the
Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the concepts of connected
coalitions and bloc voting. Our ideal point estimates indicate significant
differences between member states’ preferences, which often translate into
significant differences between empirical and theoretical power under indi-
vidual voting. However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset
differences in countries’ ideal points as the bloc size grows. This result does
not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variants differ
from the theoretical one, both under individual and bloc voting.
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1 Introduction
The power of EU member states in the Council is a recurring topic in debates of
EU treaty reforms and has been extensively studied in the literature.1 And while the
relevance of power indices is still subject to debate in the academic literature2, anecdotal
evidence suggest that they have played a non-negligible role in the political bargaining
process preceding the treaties of Nice and Lisbon. Moreover, Kauppi and Widgren
(2007) find that voting power explains almost 90 percent of the variance in budget
shares for the EU member states between 1976 and 2001.
While the theory of power indices in voting games is well researched, a key open
question is whether power indices should account for actors’ preferences (Braham and
Holler, 2005; Napel and Widgrén, 2005). This is not only relevant from an academic
perspective, but also of high policy relevance when it comes to negotiating revisions of
voting rules, since ’empirical’ (preference-based) power indices may differ significantly
from their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
Standard measures of voting power such as the Shapley and Shubik (1954) or the
Banzhaf (1965) index, defined as an actor’s individual ability to influence the outcome of
a vote on an unspecified issue, do not consider actors’ preferences. Under a probabilistic
interpretation (Straffin, 1977), this is reflected in assumptions about random voting
behavior, namely that actors’ votes are independent of each other (Banzhaf) or that
all actors are homogenous in the sense that all have the same probability of voting in
favor of a proposal (Shapley-Shubik).
These assumptions, however, are not necessarily consistent with actual voting be-
havior. Preferences may influence actors’ voting power for two reasons: First, actors
are likely to form coalitions and vote according to ’similar’ preferences. Using a spatial
voting model and building on the median voter theorem, Garrett and Tsebelis (1999b)
presume that only connected coalitions will form, i.e., only actors that are aligned next
to each other in the policy space will vote together. Ignoring preferences will therefore
cause classical power indices to overstate the power of extremist and understate the
power of centrist actors.
Second, actors with ’similar’ preferences will sometimes form a priori coalitions
(voting blocs) before the actual voting takes place (Malawski, 2004). Since the power of
a voting bloc is potentially larger than the sum of its members’ voting power, forming
voting blocs is a means for countries to increase their power (Widgrén, 1995). Taken
together, one could argue that only connected coalitions among voting blocs will form
in the voting procedure.3
These features of voting behavior, the formation of voting blocs and connected coali-
tions, can also be observed in practical politics, e.g., in the EU Council of Ministers,
where EU member states often try to form alliances with like-minded counterparts dur-
ing the negotiations, such that preference-free voting seems unlikely in practice. Against
this background the striking lack of comprehensive empirical evidence on the relevance
1 See e.g. Widgren (2009) for a survey of the literature.
2 See, e.g., Garrett and Tsebelis (1999a), Albert (2003) for a critical review of power indices.
3 The following terminology will be used throughout the paper: Preference-free and theoretical power
indices are used interchangeably. Empirical power indices (or preference-based power indices) are
used to refer to power indices, where preferences are taken into account through the formation of
a priori coalitions (voting blocs) or through the assumption that only connected coalitions (among
single actors or voting blocs) will form.
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of preferences as determinants of actors’ voting power is surprising.
This paper does not aim at adding to the theoretical controversy about the benefits
and drawbacks of preference-based power indices.4 Rather we analyze whether the
inclusion of policy preferences actually leads to a significant shift in actors’ voting
power.
To this end we study empirically whether the theoretical (preference-free) power
indices of EU member states in the EU Council of Ministers differ significantly from
their empirical (preference-based) counterparts, which take the formation of voting blocs
and connected coalitions into account. Our study builds on the to date largest dataset
of EU Council votes over the period 1993-2011, providing us with a comprehensive and
high quality dataset with potentially large variation in policy preferences among a large
(computationally challenging but still manageable) number of 27 actors.
Conceptually, we build upon Pajala and Widgrén (2004), who consider empirical
versions of the Banzhaf index incorporating actors’ preferences, which are based on
expert judgments of EU member states’ positions in a one dimensional policy space
(DEU dataset).5 Their results suggest that empirical power indices converge to the
theoretical power indices as the number of items increases. While these findings are
suggestive, the study by Pajala and Widgrén (2004) relies on a rather small dataset
including information on 45 legislative proposals over the period 1995-2000, arising from
the lack of more comprehensive data on preferences of EU member states over specific
issues.
Notwithstanding the various benefits of the DEU dataset, there are also some
caveats: Apart from the unavoidable degree of subjectivity involved in inferring prefer-
ences from expert interviews, this approach delivers only point estimates of countries’
preferences (positions), without giving information about their variability. However,
countries’ preferences and the implied preference-based power indices vary over issues
and time, since they are influenced by domestic and international political develop-
ments. To overcome this difficulty, Hagemann (2007, 2008) and Hagemann and Høy-
land (2008) suggest using Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation (Clinton et al., 2004; Bafumi
et al., 2005) based on the logistic item-response model (IRM), which allows to obtain
the posterior distribution of actors’ preferences (ideal points) from the observed voting
behavior.
The present paper adds to this strand of the literature by including preferences (ideal
points) of EU member states estimated from Council voting data for the calculation
of empirical power, using a wider range of power indices, and explicitly accounting for
the stochastic nature of preference estimates by random sampling and simulation. In
particular, it makes the following contributions.
First, we compile a new dataset comprising Council voting decisions on 3,353 propos-
als over the period 1993-2011, which is used to estimate EU member states’ preferences
from logistic item-response models. Apart from increasing the data coverage another
advantage of this approach is that it yields a posterior distribution of EU member
4 Preference-based power indices have been criticized on theoretical grounds, the key argument being
that power is a generic ability determined by the rules of a game and not by individual preferences
over outcomes (Braham and Holler, 2005). Another point of discussion is the distinction between
decisiveness and luck, where the first refers to an actor’s impact on an outcome as a combination
of preferences and capabilities, and the latter reflects simply a coincident match of preferences
with other (powerful) actors (Braham and Holler, 2005; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004).
5 See Thomson et al. (2006).
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states’ preferences rather than only single point estimates.
Second, the estimated ideal points (preferences) are used to calculate alternative
empirical variants of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, invoking the
concepts of voting blocs and connected coalitions. Thereby, we explicitly account for
the uncertainty of the preference estimates by calculating empirical power indices based
on 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution of the ideal point estimates. This yields
a distribution of the empirical power indices, whose averages can be compared and tested
against their theoretical (preference-free) counterparts.
Our findings suggest that EU member states’ preferences differ significantly from
each other, both for the full sample and for many policy areas. In addition, preferences
vary over time, which is reflected in strong changes in the composition of voting blocs
over years, i.e., no stable coalitions among EU member states exist over time. Regard-
ing the implications for power, preferences appear to have two potentially offsetting
effects: First, by ruling out subsets of unconnected coalitions and permutations, they
lead to significant power changes under individual voting. However, once we allow for
the formation of voting blocs, the difference between the empirical Banzhaf index and
its theoretical, preference-free counterpart fades away as the bloc size increases. Inter-
estingly, this result does not hold up for the Shapley-Shubik Index, whose empirical
version differs from the theoretical one even under bloc voting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the empirical
power indices used. Section 3 outlines the application of item-response models to esti-
mate EU member states preferences from observed voting behavior. Section 4 describes
the voting data and presents the estimates of EU member states’ ideal points. Section
5 calculates the empirical power indices reflecting countries’ preferences, accounting for
the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates, and tests for equality with their theoretical
(preference-free) counterparts. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices
In this section, we provide formal definitions of the theoretical (preference-free) and
empirical (preference-based) power indices that will be used in the quantitative analysis
for the EU Council of Ministers: Building on Pajala and Widgrén (2004), we introduce
empirical versions of the Banzhaf index; based on Edelmann (1997) and Perlinger (2000)
we derive an empirical version of the Shapley-Shubik index.
2.1 The Banzhaf Index
2.1.1 The Theoretical Banzhaf Index
The (normalized) Banzhaf index of country i (BFIi) gives the share of country i’s
‘swings’, i.e., winning coalitions where the removal of actor i makes them losing, in the
swings of all EU member states and is defined as
BFIi ≡
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})]∑
j∈N
∑
S⊆N [ν(S)− ν(S\{j})]
, (1)
where N is the set of EU member states (n is the number of member states), S is
a coalition (formed of s countries), and ν is a function such that ν(S) = 1 if S is a
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winning coalition, and ν(S) = 0 otherwise.6
By construction, it holds that ∑ni=1BFIi = 1. Notice that for our sample period
from 1993-2011, the number of EU member states (n) ranges from 12 to 27 (EU12:
1993-1994, EU15: 1995-4/2004, EU25: 5/2004-2006, EU27: as of 2007). Depending on
the rules of the game (voting weights, thresholds), which are reflected in the indicator
function ν, there is one theoretical Banzhaf index for each regime. In our empirical
analysis, the focus will be on the weighted qualified majority voting under the EU27
as laid down in the treaty of Nice (and prolonged by the treaty of Lisbon). Details are
provided in Appendix A.1 of the paper.
2.1.2 Empirical Banzhaf Indices
We consider two empirical variants of the Banzhaf index: the middle and the boundary
variation. Following Pajala and Widgrén (2004), the definitions are given under the
assumption of bloc voting. As an extension, we will also consider the two empirical
variants of the Banzhaf index under individual voting. The required modifications of
the definitions are straightforward and discussed below.7
A simple example, modified from Pajala and Widgrén (2004) will be used to illus-
trate the main concepts. Assume there are four voting blocs, which are aligned in the
policy space as A-B-C-D with weights A: 18, B: 8, C: 22, and D: 39. The threshold
for the passage of a proposal is 61. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 list all possible
coalitions and winning coalitions.
– Table 1 –
The Middle Variation
For the middle variation of the Banzhaf index (BFIm), only connected coalitions are
considered. With voting blocs aligned in the policy space as A-B-C-D, a coalition
consisting only of A and C would not be a connected coalition, because the actor in
the middle is missing (see Table 1). An example for a coalition that is connected and
winning would be ABCD. In this coalition, A and D are the ‘boundary’ actors, while
the actors in the middle are the ‘centrist’ actors. While ‘boundary’ actors are only
defined to be critical if they can in fact swing the vote by leaving the coalition, Pajala
and Widgrén (2004) define ‘centrist’ actors as being always critical.
We will use a slight modification of the definition by Pajala and Widgrén (2004),
which is based on the following consideration regarding the role of centrist actors.
Assume that the proposal in the policy space is ‘to the right’ of all blocks A-B-C-D.
Then, if centrist bloc B leaves the coalition, also bloc A will leave (since it is located
farther away from the proposal than B), such that only C and D remain. However, in
6 To enable a comparison of the various indices used, we use the normalized version of the Banzhaf
index, whose absolute version is given by the numerator of equation (1). Since the normalization
is merely a rescaling of the absolute indices, ensuring that they sum to one, this transformation
is immaterial for our main questions of interest, i.e., the comparison of theoretical and empirical
power indices.
7 Pajala and Widgrén (2004) also define a normal variation of the Banzhaf index, which takes only
the formation of voting bloc into account and is identical to the theoretical Banzhaf index under
individual voting. This variant is omitted for the sake of brevity, as the findings do not offer
distinct insights. The corresponding results are available are available from the authors upon
request.
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that case actor B is not critical by definition, but only if the remaining (connected)
coalition of the blocs C and D is losing.
A difficulty in the implementation is that knowledge of the position of the proposal
relative to the centrist blocs is required. If a proposal were located to the left of B,
then if B leaves, C and D would leave as well, and only bloc A would remain. Hence,
without further knowledge, both possibilities have to be considered.
To avoid the overestimation of the power of centrist actors, we define the (modified)
middle variation BFImi¯ as an index, where a centrist bloc i¯ is only critical if its with-
drawal from the coalition, along with the blocs located to the right and left of i¯, turns
the winning coalition into a losing coalition. Formally, we have
BFImi¯ ≡
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)−max[νc(S¯c\{¯i≤}), (νc(S¯c\{¯i≥})]]∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)−max[νc(S¯c\{j¯≤}), νc(S¯c\{j¯≥})]]
, (2)
where S¯\{¯i≥} (S¯\{¯i≤}) denotes the coalition S¯ excluding i¯ and the blocs to the right
(left) of i¯.
In our example in Table 1, column (4), bloc B in coalition ABCD is not critical (as
it is in the original definition by Pajala and Widgrén (2004)), since the coalition of C
and D is still winning. Thus, bloc B (as well as A) has no power at all, while C and D
each score 1/2.8
The Boundary Variation
For the boundary variation (BFIb), only connected coalitions are considered as in the
concept of the middle variation. However, centrist actors are defined as not being able
to swing a vote at all. The rationale behind this is that it is unthinkable that a centrist
leaves the coalition when the actors on both sides of him stay in the coalition.9 Thus,
only boundary actors can have a swing. The formal definition of BFIb for bloc i¯ is
given by
BFIbi¯ ≡
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{¯i})]b(¯i)∑
j¯∈N¯
∑
S¯c⊆N¯ [νc(S¯c)− νc(S¯c\{j¯})]b(j¯)
, (3)
where b(¯i) = 1 if i¯ is a boundary bloc, and b(¯i) = 0 if i¯ is a centrist bloc. In our example
in Table 1, column (5), blocs D and C have 3 and 1 boundary swings respectively and
score 3/4 and 1/4.
Notice that the boundary variation does not fit well the concept of the theoretical
Banzhaf index (ignoring the ordering of the actors) and is more closely related to the
Shapley-Shubik index. As Pajala and Widgrén (2004) point out, the boundary variation
resembles an empirical variant of the Shapley-Shubik index. Hence, we will consider
the results for the boundary variation for completeness, but focus on an exact empirical
analog to the Shapley-Shubik (and compare it with the theoretical Shapley-Shubik
index) in Section 5.3.1.
8 In the empirical analysis, we have also considered the middle variation using the original definition.
The results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar and are thus omitted for
the sake of brevity.
9 For a detailed discussion, see Garrett and Tsebelis (1999b).
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2.2 The Shapley-Shubik Index
Another widely used measure of power is the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shu-
bik, 1954), which differs conceptually from the Banzhaf index in taking the ordering of
the actors into account. In an alternative interpretation, the Banzhaf and the Shapley-
Shubik index are based on different probabilistic assumptions regarding actors’ voting
behavior.10
The theoretical Shapley-Shubik (1954) index of country i gives the share of orderings
(permutations) of the set of n countries, in which country i is pivotal and is defined as
SSIi ≡
∑
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n! [ν(S)− ν(S\{j})]. (4)
Based on Edelmann (1997) and Perlinger (2000), we derive an empirical counterpart
to the Shapley-Shubik index (SSIei ), which restricts the set of allowable permutations
while accounting for the location of the actors in the policy space. Under individual
voting, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index is given by
SSIei ≡
∑
Sc⊆N
2(|Sc|−2)
(
n−|Sc|
p−1
)
2n−1 [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (5)
where, aligning the countries in a one dimensional policy space according to their pref-
erences (ideal points), p and q index the boundary players of the coalition S = [p, . . . q],
i.e., the rank of the ‘leftmost’ (‘rightmost’) country, and b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary
actor, i.e., if actor i is either in position p or in position q, and 0 otherwise. A de-
tailed definition of allowable permutations and the derivation of the empirical SSI are
provided in Appendix A.3.
2.3 Individual Voting versus Bloc Voting
Pajala and Widgrén (2004) apply the aforementioned definitions of the empirical power
indices to N¯ voting blocs. As an extension we will calculate the empirical power indices
not only for voting blocs but also under the assumption of individual voting of the EU
member states.
In Pajala and Widgrén (2004) the sole focus on voting blocs is natural, since the EU
member states’ preferences (positions) based on expert judgments (DEU dataset) are
either different or exactly the same. This is not the case for our estimates of EU member
states’ ideal points based on actual voting behavior, which are defined as continuous
variables.
To these empirical power indices under individual voting of EU member states,
the corresponding definitions apply, replacing the set of voting blocs N¯ by the set of
member states N and replacing the coalitions among voting blocs S¯ by coalitions among
member states S. Analogously, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index under bloc voting
is obtained by replacing the set member states N by the set of voting blocs N¯ , and
replacing the coalitions among member states S by coalitions among voting blocs S¯ in
equation (5).
10 See Straffin (1977) for a discussion of the probabilistic assumptions about actors’ voting behav-
ior underlying the BFI and SSI; Paterson (2005) provides corresponding results regarding the
assumptions with respect to the voting polls.
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Irrespective of whether we consider individual or bloc voting, we are ultimately
interested in the empirical (versus theoretical) power of individual EU member states
(rather than the voting blocs). Under individual voting, countries’ power is obviously
obtained directly from the index estimates. Under bloc voting, countries’ individual
power indices are derived from the power of the voting bloc according to respective
country’s share of votes in the total votes of the bloc.11
3 Item-Response Models and Preference Estima-
tion from Voting Data
The calculation of the empirical power indices defined in Section 2 requires information
on the preferences of EU member states. We outline the approach to estimate EU
member states’ ideal points in the policy space following Hagemann (2008), who in
turn build on work by Clinton et al. (2004) and Bafumi et al. (2005).
The idea of a preference-based (spatial) voting approach is that actors are ordered
according to their preferences in a low-dimensional Euclidian policy space (e.g., but not
necessarily, on an ideological left-right scale). The locations of the actors’ preferences
are denoted as ‘ideal points’. It is assumed that actors vote in favor or against a
proposal, depending on whether their ideal point is closer to the proposal or the status
quo (Steunenberg et al., 1999; Clinton et al., 2004; Napel and Widgrén, 2004).12
In the present paper, ideal points of EU member states will be estimated from voting
data in the EU Council of Ministers. Hence, there are i = 1, . . . , n EU member states
having voted on j = 1, . . . ,m items (proposals), which results in a binary n×m matrix
Y = (yij) of member states’ individual voting decisions, where yij indicates whether
country i has voted in favor of proposal j (yij = 1) or against proposal j (yij = 0).
Each country’s position is defined as ideal point (or preference) θi, which is located
in a (one-dimensional) policy space. The status quo and the proposal are located in
the policy space with positions ψj and ζj, respectively. Countries are assumed to have
a quadratic utility function, which assigns a higher utility to positions that are closer
to the country’s ideal point in the policy space. Hence, voting in favor of a proposal is
associated with utility Ui(ζj) = −||θi − ζj||2 + ηij, whereas voting against the proposal
is associated with utility Ui(ψj) = −||θi−ψj||2 + νij, where ηij and νij are independent
error terms, reflecting uncertainty in judging the relative position of the proposal and
status quo, with E(ηij) = E(νij) = 0 and V ar(ηij − νij) = σ2j .
Under utility maximizing behavior, the probability that country i votes in favor of
proposal j is given by
P (yij = 1) = P (Ui(ζj) > Ui(ψj))
= P (νij − ηij < (θi − ψj)2 − (θi − ζj)2)
= P (νij − ηij < 2(ζj − ψj)θi + ψ2j − ζ2j )
= P ((νij − ηij)/σj < βjθi − αj), (6)
11 For alternative definitions of the distribution of power among bloc members see Alonso-Meijide
et al. (2009).
12 The framework for ideal point estimation is based on item-response models (IRM) that calculate
the probability of success of an individual in a test situation based on two factors, the subject’s
ability and the difficulty of the item (Rasch, 1980).
8
where αj = (ζ2j − ψ2j )/σj and βj = 2(ζj − ψj)/σj. Hence, the probability of a ‘yes’-
vote (piij) depends on country i’s ideal point, and the properties of item j relative to
the status quo, characterized by the ‘difficulty parameter’ αj = (ζ2j − ψ2j )/σj, and the
‘discrimination parameter’ βj = 2(ζj − ψj)/σj, indicating the distance (and direction)
between the location of the proposal and the status quo (the no vote) in the policy
space.13
Following Bafumi et al. (2005), we assume a standard logistic distribution, such that
P (yij = 1) = piij(θi, αj, βj) =
1
1 + exp(αj − βjθi) (7)
and the likelihood of the implied logit model with (unobserved) regressor θi, conditional
on the observed voting behavior Y, is given by
L(θ, β, α|Y ) =
n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
(piij)yij × (1− piij)1−yij , (8)
where θ = (θi) is an n× 1 vector and β = (βj) and α = (αj) are m× 1 vectors.
In practice, voting behavior can deviate from pure utility maximization due to
outside pressures or strategic considerations. Following Bafumi et al. (2005), this ‘non-
sincere’ voting behavior can be accounted for by introducing error rates δ0 and δ1 into
equation (8), yielding the following generalized version of the logit model
piij(θi, αj, βj, δ0, δ1) = δ0 +
(1− δ0 − δ1)
1 + exp(αj − βjθi) . (9)
The logit model underlying equation (9) cannot be estimated using standard maximum
likelihood methods, since we observe only data on voting outcomes. As suggested in
Clinton et al. (2004), we will use a simulation-based Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) approach to obtain estimates of the (posterior) distribution of coun-
tries’ ideal points, conditional on the observed voting data.
The basic idea of this procedure is as follows. If α and β were known, the ideal
points could be estimated. If the ideal points were known, α and β could be estimated.
The MCMC algorithm repeatedly performs imputations of the unknown parameters
and regressions, alternating between the ‘estimation’ of the ideal points, difficulty, and
discrimination parameters, thereby sampling utility differentials from their predictive
density (given the current values of the other parameters and the voting data).14 As
a result, we obtain the posterior distribution of the unknown parameters α, β and θ,
where our primary interest relates to the posterior distribution of the countries’ ideal
points θ (Clinton et al., 2004). Before we turn to the estimation results for the EU
Council of Ministers, a brief description of the data is given.
13 The discrimination parameter indicates how well an issue differentiates between legislators, with
high values corresponding to a strong correlation between the ideal point and the probability of
voting as expected. If βj is equal to zero, the probability of voting ‘yes’ is solely determined by the
underlying distribution of the error terms. The larger βj , the more an item discriminates among
countries and the stronger is the relation between the individual ideal point and the probability
of voting ‘yes’. In the standard case of a non-zero discrimination parameter, if the ideal point and
the difficulty parameter αj are very close, the actor is indifferent on a certain proposal (Bafumi
et al., 2005).
14 See Martin et al. (2011) for a more detailed description of the algorithm.
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4 Preferences of EUMember States: Data and Ideal
Point Estimates
4.1 Data
We compiled a new dataset of EU Council votes over the period 1993-2011 by merging
existing data sources and collecting new data for 2007-2011. In particular, we merged
Council voting data from Mattila and Lane (2001) for 1993-1998, from Hayes-Renshaw
and Wallace (2006) for 1999-04/2004, and from Mattila (2008) for 05/2004-12/2006,
and collected new data for 2007-2011 by web scraping of Council documents, using
the interface by Buhl and Rasmussen.15 This adds up to a total of 69,195 individual
voting decisions of EU member states on 3,353 proposals, which is the to date most
comprehensive and largest database on Council voting. Since unanimous votes contain
no systematic information about differences in EU member states’ preferences, only
contested votes, i.e., votes where at least one member state voted against the proposal
or abstained, are considered such that we end up with a total of 16,035 voting decisions
on 899 proposals.16
Of course, merging datasets raises several issues that deserve discussion. First, while
our new data for 2007-2011 incorporate only votes on legislative proposals, pre-2007
data also include non-legislative votes (such as Council decisions). Second, data for the
pre-1999 period were not publicly available and provided by the Council Secretariat
and are thus unlikely to fully cover all Council votes.
These shortcomings of the data have to be borne in mind. However, for the objective
of the present paper to estimate EU member states’ ideal points (preferences) from the
voting data, we attach minor relevance to these issues. First, there is no strong reason
to assume that countries’ preferences vary systematically between legislative and non-
legislative decisions, such that the potential over-representation of legislative votes in
the pre-2007 period should not introduce any distortions.
Second, the incomplete data for the pre-1999 period would only pose a problem if
the missing observations were systematically related to countries’ preferences. However,
there is no evidence for such a systematic exclusion (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). In sum, given the benefits from the comprehensive period
coverage and the large number of observations, we regard the use of a merged dataset
as justified and suited with respect to the objective of the present paper.
One general characteristic of Council voting data that might affect the estimation
of preferences should be mentioned. Due to the so-called ‘culture of consensus’ in the
Council, proposals typically only reach the voting stage if most of the initial conflicts
between countries have been resolved (Heisenberg, 2005). Thus, the number of actual
votes against proposals is very low. While such informal agreements and strategic voting
behavior is captured to some extent by introducing error rates in equation (9), this is a
limitation inherent to all studies using Council votes (Mühlböck, 2011). Collecting data
and exploring the nature of the bargaining process that takes place before proposals
enter the stage of actual voting remains a challenging and potentially fruitful avenue
15 See the application programming interface (API) website by Buhl and Rassmussen: http://
api.epdb.eu.
16 Excluding non-contested votes ensures consistency of the dataset, since the Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace (2006) data over the period 1999-04/2004 include contested votes only.
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for future research.
A final issue in coding the voting data is the treatment of abstentions. While
abstentions in voting bodies are often treated either as missing observations or as a
third vote choice, within the Council’s consensus-seeking culture, an abstention is used
to signal that a country holds an opposing view - a diplomatic version of a ‘no’-vote
(Mühlböck, 2011). Thus, we count each abstention as support of the status quo and
disapproval of the common position, i.e., abstentions are coded with 0, as are votes
against a proposal.17 If there are no observed votes of a country (e.g. because they
were not eligible to vote, e.g., the UK on issues concerning the Schengen Area or the
Euro), these observations are treated as missing data.
– Table 2 –
Table 2 provides an overview of the dataset of contested votes over the period 1993-
2011, both for the full sample and for subsamples differentiated by time period and
policy areas, showing the number of proposals voted on, the total number of individual
voting decisions by member states, and the mean share of votes in favor of an item.
4.2 Ideal Points Estimates for EU27 Member States
In the following, we report the estimates of the item-response model given by equations
(8) and (9) for the full sample over the period 1993-2011, yielding (the distribution of)
the EU27 member states’ ideal points. The estimates by policy area are discussed in
Appendix A.4.18
Results for all EU27 member states’ mean preferences over the full sample period
1993-2011, along with the 95% confidence intervals are illustrated in Figure 1.19 Obvi-
ously, information on the (simultaneous) voting behavior of all EU27 member states is
available only for the most recent period from 2007-2011. Nevertheless, the voting deci-
sions from the pre-accession periods (i.e., before 1995, 2004, and 2007) contain valuable
information on the relative positions of the (12, 15, and 25) incumbent EU members
states and are thus included in the estimation.
As can be seen from Figure 1, although there is considerable overlap of the confidence
intervals of EU member states’ ideal points, there are also several ‘gaps’ between the
17 In this respect we depart from Hagemann (2008), who consider only abstentions in qualified
majority voting (but not abstentions under unanimity) as votes against a proposal. Apart from
the view that abstentions can be reasonably argued to reflect (passive) support of the status quo,
our approach has the further advantage to generate slightly more variation in the voting data.
Since the share of abstentions is small, this choice is not crucial for our results, however.
18 The (outlier-robust) maximum likelihood estimation of the contaminated hierarchical logistic
item-response model that allows for non-sincere voting behavior (equation (9)) was performed
using the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in R. A more detailed description
of the implementation is given in Appendix A.2.
19 Our ideal point estimates thus represent country specific averages, while the confidence intervals
represent on the one hand side variation arising from changing national governments, and on
the other hand side the fact that governments that have held office for a long time period were
involved in more Council decisions (Hagemann and Høyland, 2008).
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countries’ positions.20 Northern EU member states such as Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands and Finland are located on one side of the policy space, whereas southern
member states like Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy are located on the opposite side.
Moreover, Central and Eastern European member states that joined the EU as of 2004
are located fairly close to each other in the policy space, in between northern and
southern EU member states.
Given the multidimensional nature of ideal points and policy proposals and the
variation in EU member states’ relative positions over proposals and time, the estimates
for the one-dimensional policy space should be interpreted with care. The alignment
of member states in Figure 1 should not be understood to follow a meaningful policy
dimension, e.g. in terms of ideological left-right scale. Rather, ideal point estimates
should be taken and interpreted as what they are, namely countries’ average preferences
over numerous proposals in various policy areas and time periods. However, they still
allow us to judge the proximity of countries as reflected in their average voting behavior.
– Figure 1 –
Overall, our mean ideal point estimates are in line with previous studies suggesting a
North-South pattern of coalitions in the Council, which has been complemented by an
East-West pattern after the EU enlargement in 2004 (Mattila and Lane, 2001; Naurin
and Lindahl, 2008; Mattila, 2008; Hagemann, 2008).
To judge whether the differences between EU member states’ preferences are also
significant in statistical terms, we perform pair-wise Wald tests on the equality of coun-
tries’ ideal points.21 In 130 cases (43.2%) the pair-wise test of the hypothesis of equal
ideal points is rejected at the 1% level, in 39 (13%) cases at the 5% and in 32 (10.6%)
cases at the 10% level. The joint test that all EU member states share the same ideal
point is rejected at the 1% level. Corresponding results for selected policy areas are
provided and discussed in Appendix A.4 of the paper.
5 Estimating Empirical Power Indices
The estimates of EU member states’ ideal points are used to calculate empirical power
indices as defined in Section 2, invoking the concepts of voting blocs and connected
coalitions. EU member states’ power is calculated according to the present rules gov-
erning qualified majority voting laid down in the Nice Treaty (and the Treaty of Lisbon),
20 The fact that all ideal points and confidence intervals are negative follows from equation (9), the
identification strategy, and the dataset. Actor i votes in favor of proposal j if βj and θi have the
same sign as this maximizes the likelihood function. As neither the location of a proposal nor the
yes- or no-positions are known, we restrict the country with the most/least yes-votes to be on the
negative/positive side of the policy space (i.e., -1 and 1). Since we have data only on accepted
proposals, it does not come as a surprise to observe only negative values of θi and thus βj , as the
yes-position will be closer to the proposal than the no-position.
21 Refer to the estimate of the n× 1 vector of countries’ ideal points as θˆ = (θˆi) and its (estimated)
variance-covariance matrix as Ωˆ = (σˆij), which are calculated as means, variances and covariances
of the 10000 posterior ‘observations’. The null H0 : Rθ = 0 with restriction matrix R can then
be tested using a Wald test given by m′(RΩˆR′)−1m ∼ χ2r, where m = Rθˆ is the discrepancy
vector and r is the number of restrictions (See, e.g., Greene, 2003, p.95, 487). For a pair-wise test
of identical preferences (H0 : θi = θj) the matrix R is a 1× n vector with elements 1 in the i-th
column, −1 in the j-th column, and zeros elsewhere. For a test that all ideal points are the same,
the R matrix has n− 1 rows (restrictions).
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where the necessary quorum for the adoption of a proposal is defined in terms of a cer-
tain share of the weighted votes and the population of the member states (see Appendix
A.1).
As outlined in Section 2, the empirical power indices given by equations (2)-(5) will
be calculated ‘directly’ for single EU member states assuming ‘individual voting’; in
that case no voting blocs are assumed to be formed a priori, but the preferences are
accounted for by considering connected coalitions only.
Moreover, the empirical indices given by equations (2)-(5) are calculated assuming
‘bloc voting’, where a priori unions (voting blocs) of EU member states with ‘similar
preferences’ are formed before the voting takes place (and where the individual coun-
tries’ power is calculated from the share of the country’s votes in their voting bloc).
Before turning to the estimation results, we outline how we identify voting blocs
from the estimates of the EU member states’ ideal points and how we account for the
uncertainty involved in the ideal point estimates.
5.1 Definition of Voting Blocs
In our analysis, we define two EU member states to be part of the same bloc if their dis-
tance in the policy space is below a threshold value, which is determined endogenously
by specifying a maximum number of countries that may belong to a bloc.22
Thus the threshold distance d¯ν and also the composition of the various voting blocs
is endogenously determined by the predefined maximum number of countries per voting
bloc. Limiting the maximum number of countries in a bloc is motivated by the fact
that transaction and coordination costs among member states are increasing with bloc
size, such that there is a decreasing marginal benefit of having another member added
to a bloc.
As a baseline scenario, we consider a relatively large maximum bloc size of up to
5 countries. However, in order to check the implications of alternative bloc sizes for
the estimation results, we will consider alternative values for the maximum number of
countries per bloc ranging from 2 to 5 below.23
5.2 Accounting for the Uncertainty in Ideal Point Estimates
To calculate the empirical power indices for the EU27 member states based on the ideal
point estimates for voting data over the period 1993-2011 we start by using the mean
ideal point estimates, yielding exactly one empirical power index for each country.
To take the uncertainty in the ideal point estimates (reflected in the posterior dis-
tribution of the estimates) into account, we take 10,000 repeated independent random
draws from the EU member states’ empirical posterior distribution of ideal points, and
22 More formally, let dij = |θˆi − θˆj | be the distance between the (mean) ideal point estimates for
countries i and j (i, j ∈ [1, n]). c¯ is the maximum number of countries per voting bloc. Let d¯ν be
a threshold distance and Gd¯ν (t, p) be a set of n¯ voting blocs gy(y ∈ [1, n¯]) corresponding to the
threshold distance d¯ν . Then i ∈ gy ⇔ @j ∈ gx, x 6= y : dij ≤ d¯ν and |gy| ≤ c¯ ∀ y ∈ [1, n¯]. The bloc
assignment is implemented by starting with a high value for the threshold (all countries are part
of the same bloc), and decreasing the threshold until none of the voting blocs comprises more
than the exogenously fixed maximum number of countries per bloc.
23 We limit the maximum block size to five countries as the empirical power indices remain relatively
stable (and the results remain qualitatively unchanged) for a bloc size of four members or larger
(see Section 5.3.3).
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- for each draw - (build voting blocs and) calculate empirical power indices for each EU
member state.
This yields an empirical distribution of empirical power indices, from which we
calculate the sample average along with its standard deviation. By the fundamental
theorem of statistics, we expect the sample mean of the empirical power indices to
converge to the one implied by the mean ideal point estimates.24 These estimates of
empirical power indices will then be compared with and tested against their theoretical
counterparts.
5.3 Estimation Results
Table 3 shows the theoretical and average empirical Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power
indices defined in equations (1)-(5) in Section 2 for the EU27 member states along with
their standard errors.25 To facilitate the interpretation, the countries are ordered ac-
cording to their alignment in the policy space as illustrated by the ideal point estimates
in Figure 2.
– Table 3 –
Column (1) reports the theoretical Banzhaf index, columns (2) and (3) the ‘direct’
estimates of countries’ empirical Banzhaf power indices, ignoring the formation of voting
blocs (BFImi , BFIbi ), whereas columns (4)-(5) report the countries’ empirical Banzhaf
power indices under bloc voting (BFImi¯ ,BFIbi¯ ).
Columns (6)-(8) present the theoretical Shapley-Shubik index (SSIi) and its empir-
ical variants under individual voting (SSIei ) and bloc voting (SSIei¯ ). In the following
discussion, we first consider the case of individual voting and then turn to the results
under bloc voting.
5.3.1 Individual Voting
Comparing the middle variation with the theoretical Banzhaf index, preferences matter
for EU member states’ power. For most countries (18 out of 27), the empirical indices
are significantly different from the theoretical ones in terms of a t-test (at least at 10%).
A number of small EU member states with a centrist position gain, whereas countries
with an extremist position lose. This is especially visible in those member states which
joined the EU in 2004, which are mainly aligned next to each other around the middle
of the policy space (see Figure 2). The only country from the EU15 which experiences
a significant increase in voting power (from 3.68% to 4.85%) under the middle variation
is Austria. In contrast, extreme positions at both ends of the ideal point distribution
result in a loss of voting power, as experienced by countries as Sweden, Denmark, the
UK or Germany at one end and Spain, France or Italy at the other end.
24 In fact, with 10,000 draws they turn out virtually identical.
25 We also carried out the same analysis for the EU15 using ideal point estimates based on voting
decisions over the period 1995-2004 and obtained qualitatively very similar results. Hence, the
results for the EU15 are omitted for the sake of brevity. Furthermore, to account for a potential
multidimensional policy space in EU decision-making, we carried out the analysis for individual
policy areas (cf. Kaniovski and Mueller (2011) for the European Parliament). The results are
given in Appendix A.4.
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Hence, under the middle variation, which most closely reflects the concept of con-
nected coalitions, empirical power is in fact pushed towards countries that are located
in and around the middle of the policy space, whereas the boundary players lose. This
is due to the fact that players located in the center of the policy space are also more
likely to have a centrist position in coalitions (subsets of all countries) and thus - by con-
struction - a higher probability of being critical by ‘breaking apart’ a coalition. Hence,
the behavior of the middle variation mimics the theoretical reasoning by Garrett and
Tsebelis (1999b), who introduce the concept of connected coalitions in order to push
power towards the median voter(s).
The boundary variation has the opposite effect. Compared with the theoretical
Banzhaf index centrist players lose, whereas countries at both ends of the policy space
gain. This result is plausible, since one would expect the swings in coalitions to happen
more often close to voters with extreme locations in the policy space. The boundary
variation highlights the power of the big member states (such as France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, and the UK), whereas most small countries’ power is reduced to values
close to zero. However, it should be emphasized that only the reduction in the power
of the five (centrist) countries (Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria)
is statistically significant.
– Figure 2 –
A graphical illustration of these results is given in Figure 2, which plots the theoretical
and empirical power indices (panel (a)), as well as the difference between the empirical
and theoretical power indices (panel (b)). With the countries aligned according to their
ordering in the policy space, the (deviation of the) middle and boundary variation (from
the theoretical index) show an (inverted) U-shaped pattern.
Turning to the results for the Shapley-Shubik index, for slightly more than half of
the member states (15 out of 27), the empirical power index differs from the theoret-
ical one in statistical terms. Voting power of EU member states that are located at
the boundaries of the policy space (such as Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Belgium,
Greece, Denmark and Sweden) experience a large increase in voting power. However,
the increase in voting power is statistically insignificant for most boundary countries
(except for Sweden). In contrast, virtually all countries located in the middle of the
policy space experience a large and statistically significant loss of voting power.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the patterns of the empirical Shapley-Shubik index and
the boundary variation of the Banzhaf index resemble each other closely. They are
basically equivalent for centrist countries, whereas the Shapley-Shubik index attributes
even more voting power to the boundary players.
This result is not unexpected. In the definition of the empirical Shapley-Shubik
index, only voters with boundary positions in the coalition, i.e., voters who are the
‘last’ to join a coalition can have a swing vote. An ideal point at the boundaries of
the preference-distribution (of all countries) will thus also increase the likelihood of a
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particular country to be the ‘last’ to vote for (or against) a proposal in a coalition.26
5.3.2 Bloc Voting
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 3 report the middle and boundary Banzhaf indices under
bloc voting, allowing a maximum bloc size of 5 countries. Notice that the (direction of
the) deviations of the empirical indices are the same as under individual voting: The
middle variation pushes power to the centrist players, whereas the boundary variation
pushes power to countries located at the extreme left or right of the policy space.
However, virtually none of the empirical indices (3 middle and 2 boundary variations)
differs statistically significantly from the theoretical index.
The fact that the deviations of the empirical Banzhaf indices, in particular those
of the middle variation from the theoretical Banzhaf index, are insignificant for most
countries is due to two effects of the formation of voting blocs. First, the deviations of
the empirical indices from the theoretical one become smaller in magnitude: For the
middle (boundary) variation, the average absolute deviation over all 27 EU member
states decreases from 2.6 (2.0) under individual voting to 1.8 (1.7) percentage points
under bloc voting. Second, the variability of empirical voting power in terms of standard
error increases: The average standard error of the middle (boundary) variation amounts
to 3.7 (3.8), compared with 2.7 (3.7) percentage points under individual voting.
Turning to the results for the empirical Shapley-Shubik index, we observe an in-
teresting difference to the Banzhaf index. In 9 of th 15 countries, mainly located in
the center, empirical power is different in statistical terms under bloc voting as well.
Hence, the results under bloc voting are relatively close to those under individual voting
for the Shapley-Shubik index. While the variability of empirical power is substantially
increased - the average standard error increases from 3.8 to 9.0 percentage points - the
reduction in the average absolute deviation is comparably small with 3.4 percentage
points under bloc voting and 3.7 percentage points under individual voting.
5.3.3 The Role of Bloc Size
In light of the differences between the results under individual voting (i.e., bloc voting
with a maximum bloc size of 1) and bloc voting (with a maximum bloc size of 5), we
repeat the calculation of the empirical power indices for alternative maximum bloc sizes
of 2, 3, and 4 countries. Table 4 summarizes the results and shows - for maximum bloc
sizes ranging from 1 to 5 - the average deviations and standard errors of the empirical
indices, along with the share of member states, for which the empirical power index
differs significantly from the theoretical counterpart at the 5% level.
– Table 4 –
26 Notice that - apart from Denmark and Sweden, who mark the boundary - the most drastic
decline in voting power is observed for those countries whose ideal point estimates are located in
the right of the policy space (and thus tend to be ‘no-voters’, see footnote 17). In contrast, voters
with a right position (who tend to be ‘yes-voters’, see footnote 17) still gain (though not always
significantly). This may be due to the fact that our dataset contains only voting on accepted
proposals, thereby potentially overstating the voting power of countries that usually vote in favor
of a proposal. With a dataset containing also voting on rejected proposals, we would expect to
see a more symmetric inverse U-shaped distribution of empirical power across countries in Figure
2.
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For the Banzhaf index, the differences between empirical and theoretical power indices
fade away with increasing bloc size. The threshold bloc size where the share of signifi-
cant coefficients is roughly equal to the Type I error, ranges from 3 to 4 countries. In
contrast, voting power implied by empirical Shapley-Shubik index, which differs from
its theoretical counterpart for 55% of the EU member states under individual voting,
turns out to be relatively insensitive against the formation of voting blocs. Even with
a maximum bloc size of five countries, the share of significantly different indices still
amounts to 37%, which is clearly above the Type I error.
This adds another interesting dimension where the results between the Banzhaf and
the Shapley-Shubik index differ strongly from each other. While changes of single EU
member states’ power implied by treaty reforms are often very similar in terms of both
indices, the proportionality of the voting system and its efficiency are typically much
larger for the Shapley-Shubik index.27 Our results suggest a further difference regarding
the sensitivity of the theoretical measures against the consideration of preferences in
general, and the implications of the formation of voting blocs in particular. The central
role of pivotal boundary actors inherent in the logic of the Shapley-Shubik index appears
to dominate the results even under bloc voting.
6 Conclusions
This paper tests whether differences in actors’ preferences translate into significant
differences between theoretical and empirical power indices, using voting data from the
EU Council of Ministers over the period 1993-2011. We consider empirical variants
of the Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index, taking countries’ preferences into
account by restricting the set of allowable coalitions and permutations (depending on
the alignment of the countries in the policy space) and by allowing for the formation of
a priori unions (bloc voting).
EU member states’ preferences in a one-dimensional policy space are calculated
using logistic-item response models, which provide estimates of countries’ average pref-
erences over the sample period and their distribution. Using random draws of countries’
preferences from this posterior distribution yields a posterior distribution of implied em-
pirical power indices, both under individual voting and bloc voting, whose averages are
then tested for equality with the respective theoretical, preference-free indices.
Results from the ideal point estimation show that EU member states’ preferences
do in fact differ significantly from each other, both for the full sample and for many
policy areas. The formation of voting blocs increases the variability of empirical power.
Hence, bloc voting may in fact be a means for countries to increase their power by
strategically forming alliances with like-minded actors, though its potential will depend
on the distribution of preferences for a particular voting item at hand.
Allowing for connected coalitions only, the differences in countries’ preferences often
translate into significant differences between countries’ empirical power and theoretical
power, suggesting that the disregard of preferences may result in an incomplete picture
of voting power.
However, the formation of voting blocs appears to offset to some extent differences in
countries’ ideal points in the policy space by reducing the average deviation between em-
27 Paterson (2005) discusses the large differences between efficiency implied by the Banzhaf and the
Shapley-Shubik approach in the EU Council of Ministers after the treaty of Nice.
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pirical and theoretical power and increasing the variation in countries empirical power.
With growing size of the voting blocs, the difference between the empirical Banzhaf
indices and the theoretical Banzhaf index fades away. Interestingly, this result does
not hold for the Shapley-Shubik index, whose empirical variant, while showing a larger
variation, differs from the theoretical both under individual voting and bloc voting.
Overall, our estimates suggest that preferences matter, with two apparently offset-
ting effects. On the one hand, they rule out certain coalitions (among countries remote
from each other in the policy space), thereby leading to a change in empirical power
under individual voting. The magnitude and direction of the change cannot be deter-
mined generally since it will depend not only on the size (number of votes) of a country
but also on its position in the policy space, which will vary over issues and time.
On the other hand, the formation of voting blocs reduces the number of and the het-
erogeneity among actors, and thereby the difference between empirical and theoretical
power indices. Again, the formation of voting blocs, as well as their size and composi-
tion, will vary over issues and time, making general statements potentially misleading.
However, a key finding is that preferences - besides the rules of the voting game - can
lead to sizeable shifts and large variations of actors’ power.
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Table 1: Illustration of Preference-based (Empirical) Power Indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coalition S¯ Winning Connected Middle Boundary
A X
AB X
AC
AD
ABC X
ABD X
ACD X
ABCD X X C, D D
B X
BC X
BD
BCD X X C, D D
C X
CD X X C, D C,D
D X
Total swings 6 4
Notes: There are four voting blocs (N¯ = 4), which are located in the policy space A-B-C-D
with voting weights A: 18, B: 8, C: 22, and D: 39; the quorum is 61.
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Table 2: EU Council Voting Data: Overview and Some Descriptive Statistics
Proposals Individual Voting Decisions1) Share of ‘Yes’ Votes2)
Total 899 16035 88.33
By year
1993 9 108 86.11
1994 55 660 86.66
1995 77 1155 90.82
1996 47 705 89.50
1997 51 765 89.80
1998 55 825 88.60
1999 47 705 89.07
2000 54 810 83.58
2001 56 840 86.90
2002 75 1125 83.28
2003 88 1320 85.90
2004 47 865 87.28
2005 56 1400 86.92
2006 70 1750 88.00
2007 16 429 94.17
2008 19 510 91.96
2009 27 723 93.64
2010 30 804 92.41
2011 20 536 91.6
By Policy Area3)
Agriculture 239 3869 88.73
Cohesion 6 124 89.51
Ecofin 23 449 89.08
Energy 3 57 94.73
Environment 59 1122 89.21
Development 4 96 95.83
Fisheries 85 1432 90.57
General Affairs 53 1248 82.21
Health + Health & Consumer Affairs 41 736 88.85
Internal Market 124 2098 89.41
Institutions 10 256 91.01
Justice and Home Affairs 22 522 93.48
Research, Education & Culture 26 463 90.06
Social Policy 16 360 89.44
Statistical System 15 317 93.37
Telecommunication 19 367 92.91
Trade 15 225 75.11
Transparency 79 1179 79.81
Transport 58 1085 90.96
Notes: Data from 1993-2006 merged from Mattila and Lane (2001); Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006),
Mattila (2008); data as of 2007 collected from web scraping of Council documents using the interface by Buhl
and Rasmussen (http://api.epdb.eu). 1) Number of observations of individual voting decisions is equal
to the number of proposals times the number of EU member states that have participated in the voting. 2)
Mean of yit (×100 in %), corresponding to the share of ‘Yes’ votes in all voting decisions. 3) Categorization
into policy areas follows Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (2006). Research, education, and culture were merged
into one policy area due to the small number of observations. Two items could not be assigned to a particular
policy area; hence the proposals by policy area sum up to 897 items for the full period 1993-2011. Information
on the policy areas Statistical System, Cohesion, Development, and Energy is only provided for completeness;
due to the low number of contested votes, they are not considered in the following.
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Table 3: Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices, EU27 (2007-2011)
Banzhaf Index, Individual Voting1) Banzhaf Index, Bloc Voting2) Shapley-Shubik Index3)
BFIi BFI
m
i BFI
b
i BFI
m
i¯
BFIb
i¯
SSIi SSI
e
i SSI
e
i¯
Spain 7.43 2.29** 11.14 3.02 10.38 8.00 16.25 17.56
(2.05) (6.39) (3.01) (8.01) (13.47) (35.33)
France 7.78 2.48*** 13.44 4.02 12.99 8.68 18.00 17.08
(1.93) (7.78) (3.09) (8.91) (1.60) (41.50)
Portugal 3.68 2.67 4.69 2.83 4.58 3.41 5.04 5.67
(1.91) (5.28) (2.78) (5.00) (6.44) (13.51)
Italy 7.78 3.35** 11.33 5.22 11.5 8.68 11.54 11.82
(1.83) (9.35) (3.25) (9.39) (14.57) (31.89)
Belgium 3.68 3.13 3.56 3.41 4.41 3.41 4.24 3.61
(2.05) (5.33) (2.79) (4.96) (6.07) (9.87)
Greece 3.68 3.14 4.16 3.56 4.39 3.41 3.85 4.01
(1.95) (4.85) (2.93) (4.97) (6.05) (12.05)
Luxembourg 1.25 3.48 1.62 2.46 1.36 1.10 0.73 0.89
(1.69) (3.17) (3.07) (2.4) (1.57) (3.62)
Ireland 2.18 4.01 1.81 3.36 2.03 1.96 1.18 1.45
(1.66) (3.33) (3.06) (3.01) (2.63) (7.16)
Austria 3.09 4.85** 0.72 5.21 1.04 2.82 0.04*** 0.46
(0.71) (2.3) (3.12) (2.66) (0.19) (3.09)
Cyprus 1.25 4.74*** 0.23 3.22 0.44 1.10 0.07*** 0.28
(0.95) (1.32) (3.14) (1.27) (0.38) (1.80)
Hungary 3.68 4.86 0.76 5.38 0.87 3.41 0.45 0.55
(0.8) (2.5) (2.93) (2.61) (3.02) (6.13)
Slovakia 2.18 4.95*** 0.08*** 4.45 0.21* 1.96 0.09** 0.12
(0.58) (0.77) (3.12) (1.07) (0.90) (2.36)
Slovenia 1.25 4.95*** 0.07* 3.55 0.11* 1.10 0.00*** 0.02***
(0.54) (0.71) (3.33) (0.61) (0.32) (0.24)
Malta 0.94 4.98*** 0.08 3.00 0.1 0.82 0.01*** 0.02***
(0.44) (0.83) (3.37) (0.59) (0.13) (0.20)
Czech Republic 3.68 4.97*** 0.32** 5.52 0.48* 3.41 0.00*** 0.02***
(0.45) (1.55) (2.85) (1.68) (0.01) (0.24)
Romania 4.26 4.77 0.68* 5.4 1.26 3.99 0.26** 0.22
(0.9) (2.16) (2.8) (2.86) (1.65) (2.76)
Bulgaria 3.09 4.71* 0.32* 4.44 1.21 2.82 0.18 0.16**
(0.9) (1.59) (2.89) (2.36) (1.81) (1.14)
Latvia 1.25 4.87*** 0.00 3.13 0.26 1.10 0.00*** 0.01***
(0.67) (0.00) (3.19) (0.72) (0.01) (0.03)
Lithuania 2.18 4.90*** 0.48 4.05 0.55 1.96 0.00*** 0.02***
(0.49) (1.92) (3.08) (1.43) (0.00) (0.14)
Poland 7.43 4.73*** 4.06 6.83 4.7 8.00 0.19*** 6.16
(0.86) (5.95) (2.57) (6.17) (0.94) (3.35)
Estonia 1.25 4.38*** 0.83 2.55 0.88 1.10 0.02*** 0.05***
(1.2) (2.51) (2.91) (1.59) (0.11) (0.16)
Germany 7.79 4.70*** 7.77 6.65 10.42 8.67 0.09*** 0.59***
(0.76) (6.42) (2.51) (7.17) (0.48) (1.51)
Finland 2.18 3.51 3.47 2.65 3.73 1.96 0.04*** 0.25***
(1.35) (4.25) (2.47) (3.27) (0.09) (0.58)
Netherlands 3.97 2.13 5.29 2.31 5.32 3.68 0.90** 1.63
(1.14) (4.91) (1.7) (4.13) (1.34) (3.45)
United Kingdom 7.79 1.90*** 13.75 3.00*** 11.35 8.67 4.18 6.70
(0.8) (5.7) (1.69) (7.22) (3.47) (12.00)
Denmark 2.18 0.37*** 4.15 0.50** 2.44 1.96 7.35 5.96
(0.32) (4.29) (0.77) (4.24) (5.52) (10.56)
Sweden 3.09 0.19*** 5.18 0.29*** 2.99 2.82 25.29** 20.41
(0.21) (4.87) (0.55) (5.15) (9.34) (39.81)
Notes: Means and standard errors of EU27 member states’ empirical power indices, based on 1000 draws from posterior distribution of
member states’ ideal points (period 1993-2011). Middle variation (BFIm
i¯
), boundary variation ((BFIb
i¯
)). All indices are normalized
(displayed in %). ***, **, * indicate whether the null that the empirical index is equal to the theoretical one is rejected at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level by a t-test.
1) Power indices of EU27 member states calculated ‘directly’ under individual voting. The first column reports the theoretical
Banzhaf index.
2) Power indices of EU27 member states under bloc voting, given by the power of the voting bloc times the share of the respective
country’s votes in the total votes of the bloc.
3) SSI. . . Shapley-Shubik index.
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Table 4: Bloc Voting and the Role of Maximum Bloc Size
Maximum Bloc Size
1 2 3 4 5
BFIm average deviation 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8
average standard error 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.7
share significant 63.0 22.2 14.8 11.1 11.1
BFIb average deviation 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
average standard error 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.8
share significant 7.4 7.4 7.4 0.0 0.0
SSIe average deviation 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4
average standard error 3.6 5.1 7.0 8.0 9.1
share significant 55.6 44.4 44.4 40.7 37.0
Notes: Table reports the average (absolute) deviation between the theoretical and the empirical indices (in percent-
age points), the average standard error of the empirical indices (in percentage points), and the share of the EU27
member states (in percent), for which the respective empirical index is significantly different from the theoretical
one at the 5% level.
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Table A1: Votes and Population Shares of EU27 Member States)
Country Votes (no.) Votes (%) Pop. (%) Country Votes (no.) Votes (%) Pop. (%)
Austria 10 2.90 1.67 Latvia 4 1.16 0.46
Belgium 12 3.48 2.14 Lithuania 7 2.03 0.68
Bulgaria 10 2.90 1.55 Luxembourg 4 1.16 0.10
Cyprus 4 1.16 0.16 Malta 3 0.87 0.08
Czech Republic 12 3.48 2.08 Netherlands 13 3.77 3.30
Denmark 7 2.03 1.10 Poland 27 7.83 7.70
Estonia 4 1.16 0.27 Portugal 12 3.48 2.14
Finland 7 2.03 1.07 Romania 14 4.06 4.35
France 29 8.41 12.85 Slovakia 7 2.03 1.09
Germany 29 8.41 16.62 Slovenia 4 1.16 0.41
Greece 12 3.48 2.26 Spain 27 7.83 8.98
Hungary 12 3.48 2.03 Sweden 10 2.90 1.84
Ireland 7 2.03 0.87 United Kingdom 29 8.41 12.27
Italy 29 8.41 11.94
Notes: See ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union’, Protocol No. 36 on transitional provisions, Article 3. The population figures refer to 2007 and are taken from
Eurostat.
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Table A2: Empirical BFIs by Policy Area (EU27, voting blocs)
BFImı¯ BFI
b
ı¯
RMSE # RMSE #
Full Sample 2.43 3 2.96 0
Agriculture 3.08 2 3.32 0
Ecofin 3.25 0 2.37 0
Environment 3.27 0 2.84 0
General Affairs 2.89 1 3.02 0
Health 3.03 2 2.88 0
Institutions 3.09 0 2.67 0
Internal Market 3.01 2 2.51 0
Justice and Home 3.92 0 3.51 1
Social 3.51 0 2.73 1
Telecommunications 4.34 0 2.21 0
Trade 3.04 0 2.34 0
Transparency 3.29 1 2.18 0
Transport 2.87 0 2.69 0
Notes: RMSE is the root mean squared error of the difference between the theoretical and
the respective empirical Banzhaf index over the EU27 member states; # denotes the number
of countries’ of which the empirical index is significantly different from the theoretical one
(in terms of a t-test at the 5% level).
Table A3: Joint Tests for Equal Ideal Points by Policy Area
Policy Area Test Statistic Policy Area Test Statistic Policy Area Test Statistic
Overall 300.28*** Health & Cons Affairs 34.60 Social Policy 0.01
Agriculture 135.19*** Internal Market 40.01** Trade 51.08***
Ecofin 0.01 Institutions 0.00 Telecommunication 0.01
Environment 0.18 Institutions 0.00 Transparency 154.47***
General Affairs 77.15*** Justice & Home Affairs 0.00 Transport 0.04
Notes: Test statistic from joint Wald test on equality of countries’ ideal points. ***, **, * indicate significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Figure 1: Estimates of EU Member States’ Ideal Points, 1993-2011
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Figure 2: Theoretical and Empirical Power Indices, EU27 (2007-2011)
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Figure A1: Estimates of EU Member States’ Ideal Points by Policy Area, 1993-2011
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Appendix
A.1 Voting Weights and Populations Shares of EU27 Member
States
– Table A1 –
The regime of weighted qualified majority voting for the EU27 as laid down in the treaty
of Nice has been in place since 2007 and prolonged by the Treaty of Lisbon till 10/2014.
It will be replaced - after a transitional regime as of 11/2014 - by a system of double
majority voting as of 03/2017. The country’s number and shares of votes, along with
their populations shares are given in Table A1. In the standard case, the threshold for
the passage of a proposal (by the Commission) amounts to 255 votes (73.9%) out of the
total of 345 votes, with an absolute majority of the member states in favor. In addition,
the treaty stipulates that if a decision was adopted by a qualified majority it shall be
verified upon request of one member of the Council whether the qualified majority is
representing at least 62% of the total population of the EU (so-called ‘Demographic
Clause’). If this threshold turns out not to have been met, the decision shall not be
adopted.
A.2 Estimation of EU Member States’ Ideal Points
Following Hagemann (2008), we estimate the parameters of the one-dimensional con-
taminated hierarchical logistic item response model (IRM) in equation (9) with max-
imum likelihood, using the MCMCirtKdRob function in the MCMCpack library in
R.28 The Bayesian estimation of the likelihood function uses a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) simulation method that draws from a prior distribution, estimates the
parameters and updates the prior distribution. In particular, the MCMC algorithm
draws 110,000 times from the (updated) prior distribution. The first 10,000 draws are
discarded to find an arbitrary starting point in the country-item-space, then the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of the mean and the variance of the parameters of each 10th
draw are recorded, yielding a posterior distribution made up of 10,000 observations.
We assign non-informative priors to avoid influencing the posterior distribution with
subjective prior beliefs.29 Following Martin et al. (2011), country i’s ideal point θi is
assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, for the item parameters αj and βj
the (normal) prior distribution [αj, βj]′ ∼ N(K+1)(b0,j, B0,j) is assumed, where B0,j is
a diagonal matrix for the prior precision of the independent normal prior on the item
parameters. Like Hagemann (2008) we set the precision equal to 1/σ2 = 0.25 which
implies a priori variance equal to 4. The error rates δ0 and δ1 are estimated from the
data and are assumed to follow an independent uniform (0, 0.1) prior distribution.
Finally, for identification constraints on θi have to be imposed; in a one-dimensional
policy space two constraints are sufficient for identification (Clinton et al., 2004). In
particular, we deduce the restrictions from the data and restrict the country with the
largest share of yes-votes to be negative and the one with the largest share of no-votes to
28 We would like to thank Bjørn Høyland for sharing his R-code (see http://folk.uio.no/
bjornkho/).
29 Clinton et al. (2004) find that the results for voting in the US senate and the US House of
Representatives in general appear to be insensitive to the choice of the prior.
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be positive. However, the posterior distributions turn out to be insensitive to the choice
of identifying restrictions, given that our model is locally identified by two arbitrary
constraints (Rivers, 2003).
A.3 A Preference-Based Shapley-Shubik Index
A.3.1 The Edelmann/Perlinger Index
Perlinger (2000) derives a preference-based Shapley-Shubik Index, based on a framework
by Edelmann (1997), which restricts the number of allowable permutations to so called
‘maximal chains’ (M), defined as permutation of the n actors in the (’spectrum’) game,
where the actor in position i (of the permutation) is the ideological neighbor to an actor
in position 1, 2, . . . , i− 1 for all i ∈ N .30 It is given by
∑
M
1
m
[ν(M i)− ν(M i\{i})], (A.1)
where m = 2n−1 denotes the total number of allowable permutations (maximal chains)
in a spectrum game with n actors, and M i denotes a coalition consisting of i and its
predecessors in the maximal chain M . Finally, ν(M i) = 1 if M i is a winning coalition
and ν(M i) = 0 otherwise.
The reasoning behind equation (A.1) is that - as an equivalent to the empirical
Banzhaf index which allows only connected coalitions - a notion of allowable permuta-
tions of actors of the set N is required for an empirical Shapley-Shubik index. Hence,
the Edelmann/Perlinger-Index allows only those permutations of N that consist of con-
nected coalitions at any point. For example, assume that N = {A,B,C} and that
actors are aligned as A-B-C in a one-dimensional policy space. Then, {B,C,A} would
be allowed, but {A,C,B} would not, as {A,C} is not a connected coalition. These
allowable permutations are exactly the maximal chains.
A.3.2 An Alternative Definition of the Empirical Shapley-Shubik Index
For computational reasons - the number of maximal chains increases very quickly with
the number of actors n - we derive an alternative formula (equivalent to Edelmann/Perlinger-
Index), which does not sum over maximal chains but over connected coalitions (as we
do for the empirical Banzhaf indices) and which also more directly reveals the relation
between the theoretical and the empirical SSI.
The derivation builds on the definition of the standard Shapley-Shubik index, which
gives the share of all permutations of actors of the set N , where actor i is pivotal:
SSIi =
∑
S⊆N
ab
c
d =
∑
S⊆N
(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n! [ν(S)− ν(S\{i})] (A.2)
Note that in equation (A.2) the term a ≡ n! gives the total number of orderings and
d ≡ [ν(S) − ν(S\{i})] = 1 if actor i is pivotal. Fixing the position of actor i, the
number of orderings of actors preceding actor i is given by a ≡ (|S|− 1)! = (s− 1)! and
the number of orderings of the actors following actor i is b ≡ (|N | − s) = (n− s)!.
30 Two member states are called ideological or preference-based neighbors if there are no other
member states who, based on their preference estimates, are in a position between them.
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In the following we provide corresponding definitions of the terms a, b, c, and d
restricting the orderings to the number of allowable permutations, referred to as ac, bc,
and cc and sum over connected coalitions only. The number of maximal chains with
actor i exactly in position |Sc| = s is given by acbc. Thereby, ac equals the number of
options to build a chain of the elements of Sc (a so-called saturated chain from ∅ to Sc
in the notation of Edelmann (1997)), where actor i joins last. According to Lemma 1
in Edelmann (1997),
ac = 2(|Sc|−1)−1) = 2|Sc|−2 (A.3)
The term bc equals the number of options how to extend this saturated chain to a
maximal chain, i.e., to allowably order the remaining actors of the set N (or, in other
words, the number of saturated chains from Sc to N = [1, . . . , n]). According to Lemma
2 in Edelmann (1997)
bc =
(
n− |Sc|
p− 1
)
, (A.4)
with p indexing the ’left’ boundary player of Sc = [p, . . . , q].
As an equivalent to the number of permutations a ≡ n! in the original Shapley-
Shubik index, the number of maximal chains in a spectrum game with n actors is given
by cc = 2n−1 according to Lemma 1 in Edelmann (1997).
Finally, only winning and connected coalitions, where actor i is pivotal (which is
only the case if actor i is a boundary actor, i.e., either in position p or q of Sc = [p, q])
have to be considered, which is accomplished by redefining term d as
dc = [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (A.5)
where b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor. Summing up, we arrive at the following
equivalent definition of the empirical Shapley-Shubik index:
SSIei =
∑
Sc⊆N
2(|Sc|−2)
(
n−|Sc|
p−1
)
2n−1 [νc(Sc)− νc(Sc\{i})]b(i), (A.6)
where Sc is a connected coalition, νc(Sc) = 1 if S is a winning and connected coalition,
p is the ’left’ boundary player of Sc = [p, q], and b(i) = 1 if i is a boundary actor, i.e.,
actor i is either in position p or in position q and 0 otherwise.
A.4 Results by Policy Area
A.4.1 Estimates of EU Member States’ Ideal Points
To account for the potential multidimensional nature of the policy space and differences
between policy areas, we estimate ideal points for different subsamples. The estimates
of the subsamples show considerable variation over years and policy areas. Results for
some policy areas of particular interest are displayed in Figure A1. The North-South
divide obtained in previous studies does appear in some, but not all policy areas. While,
e.g., the results for the policy area ‘General Affairs’ are pretty much in line with the
findings in Figure 1 covering the whole dataset, there are no North-South or East-West
coalition patterns to be found in the field of ‘Health and Consumer Affairs’.
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A possible explanation for these differences is that the policy area ‘General Affairs’
consists of topics the foreign ministers are concerned with, i.e., mostly foreign affairs,
but also a range of issues not covered by other Council configurations. Due to this
diversity of issues within that policy area, it is not surprising that the distribution of
ideal point estimates is rather similar to the general distribution in Figure 1.
This is not the case for the policy area ‘Health and Consumer Affairs’. Here, the
extreme position of Germany might be due to the fact that Germany has already
detailed legislation concerning health policy or consumer protection and thus more
often supports the status quo (and rejects new EU legislation that potentially requires
costly changes of national law) than other EU member states.
– Figure A1 –
Similar reasons might account for the ideal point distribution of the policy area ‘Inter-
nal Market’. Here no clear distinction between northern and southern or eastern and
western EU member states can be detected. Yet another pattern exists for the policy
area ‘Agriculture’, where we find France and Ireland, two EU member states that are
strongly supporting agricultural subsidies, on one side of the spectrum, and the UK
and Sweden, who traditionally oppose such a policy on the other side.
– Table A2 –
Finally, it should be mentioned that not in all policy areas the null hypothesis of
identical preferences can be rejected. Table A2 gives the joint tests on equality of the
ideal point estimates for the different policy areas, showing that in 5 of 14 policy areas
(Agriculture, Trade, Transparency, General Affairs, Internal Market) the hypothesis of
equality is rejected at least at the 5% level. In the remaining policy areas the joint test
is insignificant.
A.4.2 Empirical Power Indices
Table A3 reports summary results for the empirical power indices, both for the full
sample and also by policy area under bloc voting.31 In particular, it gives - for each
variant of the empirical power index - the root means squared error (RMSE) of the
difference between the theoretical and empirical power indices over all 27 EU member
states and the number of countries where the deviations of the empirical power index
from the theoretical one turned out significant.
– Table A3 –
The deviation of the RMSE is is fairly small with values around 3% and tends to be
slightly larger for some policy areas (compared with the full sample), in particular for
those, where the ideal point estimates indicate significant differences in the EU member
31 For computational reasons, we did not consider individual voting for all policy areas and the
Shapley-Shubik index, but some explorative calculations suggest no qualitative differences com-
pared with the full sample: Under individual voting, the empirical Banzhaf indices (in particular
the middle variation) differ significantly from the theoretical ones for many EU member states,
while they hardly do under bloc voting with a maximum bloc size of 3 or more countries. In
contrast, the empirical Shapley-Shubik index differs from the theoretical one in most cases.
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states’ preferences (Agriculture, General Affairs, Internal Market, Trade, Transparency;
see Table A2).
Finally, also for the policy areas, the t-tests reject the equality of theoretical and
empirical power indices only in a very small number of cases, suggesting once more that
the deviation of the empirical power indices (and the role of preferences) is moderate
at best under bloc voting. This is a result we expect to hold if voting blocs change
frequently and unsystematically from proposal to proposal, such that the effect of al-
lowing for connected coalitions is averaged out over a large number of proposals under
bloc voting.
To provide some informal evidence on this hypothesis, we estimate EU member
states’ ideal points for each year over the period 1993-2011, and consider the bloc
formation for each year to see whether there are stable voting blocs (of a least two
countries) over time. It turns out that no such stable coalitions can be identified,
pointing to large variations in the relative ideal points from year to year (proposal to
proposal) and hence a large variation in the size and composition of voting blocs. This
result is also in line with Pajala and Widgrén (2004), who argue that no stable minimal
coalitions exist over time.
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